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	Introduction	to	Serres,	‘Transdisciplinarity	as	Relative	Exteriority’	
	
		 I	 am	 standing	 in	 the	 empty	 intersection	 between	 these	two	groups,	 in	 this	space	of	which	 I	am	trying	 to	speak	the	 cartography.	 White	 space	 deprived	 of	 stakes	 and	fights.	(Serres,	1980:	17)	 		Partaking	 in	what	Patrice	Maniglier	 (2011:	20)	describes	as	 the	 ‘transversal	adventure	of	thought’	 of	 the	 1960s	 in	 France,	 Michel	 Serres’	 early	 works	 can	 be	 read	 as	 a	 series	 of	internal	displacements	of	 one	discipline	by	 another,	 engaging	philosophy	 into	permanent	decentring.	 At	 the	 convergence	 of	 Structuralism,	 Cybernetics	 and	 the	 history	 of	 science,	Serres	 uncovered	 two	 principal	 transdisciplinary	 logics:	 one	 tied	 to	 idealities	 (abstract	forms),	 the	other	to	the	empirical	domain	(concrete	 information).	Since	Serres	 is	not	only	interested	 in	 relations	 between	 or	 across	 disciplines,	 but	 more	 broadly	 in	 the	 way	information	 is	 conduced	 from	one	 systemic	 entity	 to	 another,	 his	 ‘transdisciplinarity’	 can	also	be	described	as	a	general	theory	and	practice	of	translation,	textual	or	empirical.	Each	of	the	Hermès	volumes,	which	collect	texts	that	Serres	wrote	between	1961	and	1980,	shed	a	different	light	on	the	problem	of	trandisciplinarity.	At	times	identifying	a	space,	at	other	times,	a	specific	relation	between	 ‘regions’,	each	volume	needs	to	be	grasped	through	this	double	 perspective. 1 	Yet,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 assessing	 Serres’	 conception	 of	
transdisciplinarity	in	any	precise	way,	an	important	difficulty	arises,	stemming	from	Serres’	tie	 to	 Leibniz’s	 philosophy,	 and	 to	 Classical	 thought	 more	 generally.	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	Serres	 voluntarily	 oscillates	 between	 the	 standpoint	 of	 trans-disciplinarity,	 and	 that	 of	a-	(or	 pre-)	 disciplinarity.	 Rather	 than	 straightforwardly	 ‘acritical’	 (Latour,	 1987),	 his	philosophy	 subverts	 the	 Kantian	 ‘limits’	 into	 a	 topology	 of	 limits	 as	 borders,	 points	 of	passage	 and	 interactions.	 In	 other	 words	 the	 constitution	 of	 his	 ‘transdisciplinarity’	 can	only	be	unstable,	constantly	put	in	question	by	the	change	of	‘scales’	of	these	maps,	by	the	transformation	of	the	very	entities	between	which	relations	can	be	established.			Serres’	encounter	with	Leibniz’s	philosophy	proved	to	be	a	watershed	in	his	elaboration	of	the	problem	of	transdisciplinarity,	providing	it	with	a	structural	and	systematic	framework.	His	 doctoral	 thesis	 Le	 système	de	Leibniz	 et	 ses	modèles	mathématiques	 (1968)	 interprets																																																									1	The	 titles	 of	 the	Hermès	 series	 can	 be	 taken	 as	 indications	 of	 this	 double	 outlook	:	 whilst	 Communication	(1968)	 Translation	 (1974),	 and	 the	 North-Western	 Passage	 (1980)	 refer	 to	 forms	 of	 relations,	 Interference	(1972)	and	Distribution	(1977)	tend	to	configure	the	space	in	which	these	relations	occur.			
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Leibniz’s	 system	as	 an	 ‘exemplary	 architecture’.	 This	 structure	 is	 exemplary	because	 it	 is	fully	coherent	and	fundamentally	pluralist	at	the	same	time.	Organised	by	a	multiplicity	of	principles	 of	 coherence,	 it	 is	 not	 only	 made	 of	 analytic	 logic	 (formal	 language),	 but	 also	contains	 a	 morphology,	 topology	 or	 aesthetics	 (language	 of	 forms).	 (Serres,	 1974:	 117)	Besides	the	classical	deductive	sequences,	Leibniz’s	system	is	constituted	by	a	transversal	logic	 of	 forms,	 which	 transcends	 the	 frontiers	 of	 particular	 areas	 of	 knowledge.	 Serres’	demonstration	 relies	 on	 showing	 how	 Leibniz’s	 mathematical	 models	 were	 translated	through	 various	 regions	 of	 the	 Encyclopaedia,	 regardless	 of	 their	 eligibility	 for	 a	 higher	principle	of	disciplinary	partition	(philosophy,	biology,	law,	theology,	…).	At	the	same	time,	each	 of	 these	 models	 can	 be	 ascribed	 a	 fundamental	 transdisciplinary	 logic	 of	generalisation,	 a	 capacity	 to	 produce	 transversal,	 total	 views	 of	 the	 system.	 In	 Leibniz’s	system,	 the	 ‘inside’	of	any	given	region	 is	 fundamentally	exogenous.	Hence	 the	concept	of	‘relative	exteriority’,	in	the	passage	we	translate	below.			By	 thinking	 the	 system	 as	 a	 ‘structure’	 involving	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 ‘models’	 Serres	 was	problematizing	the	very	notion	of	disciplinarity	from	a	pre-critical	point	of	view.	Leibniz’s	multiple	attempts	at	creating	a	‘universal	characteristics’	and	a	mathesis	universalis	are	the	most	evident	expressions	of	 this.	Prior	 to	 the	segmentation	of	knowledge,	 representation,	not	yet	under	the	glare	of	critique,	constituted	a	liminal	space	from	which	to	reason,	a	space	where	logics	and	analogy,	the	logics	of	science	and	that	of	images	were	knitted	together	in	rigour.2	But	this	 ‘prior’	could	as	well	be	transformed	into	an	 ‘after’:	behind	his	exegesis	of	Leibniz,	 Serres	 was	 in	 fact	 addressing	 contemporary	 science	 and	 its	 various	transdisciplinary	logics	or	‘state	of	interference’(Serres,	1972).			Another	crux	of	Serres’	early	writings	was	to	overcome	philosophy’s	pretention	to	rule	over	the	 sciences	 and	 the	 corresponding	 assertion	 of	 science’s	 autonomy.	 By	 claiming	 the	autonomy	 of	 science,	 Serres	 was	 appropriating	 and	 generalising	 a	 proposition	 that	 had	emerged	from	the	philosophy	of	mathematics,	and	had	been	channelled	through	the	French	epistemological	tradition	since	the	1930s.	According	to	Jean	Cavaillès	and	Albert	Lautman,	the	 crisis	 of	 the	 fundaments	 and	 the	 birth	 of	 ‘modern	 algebra’	 had	 revealed	 that	mathematics	 possessed	 an	 autonomous	 becoming,	 thereby	 embodying	 a	 singular	 form	of	historicity	 (Cavaillès,	 1960	 &	 2011:	 65-70).	 As	 Serres	 would	 summarise,	 mathematics																																																									2	Serres’	 reflections	on	the	mathesis	universalis	and	the	Classical	Age	were	partly	coterminous	with	Foucault’s	project	 in	 the	 Order	 of	 Things	 (1966),	 but	 his	 approach	 proved	 diametrically	 opposed	 to	 the	 latter:	 whilst	Foucault	consigned	the	Classical	Age	on	the	(distant	shore)	of	an	epistemic	gulf,	Serres	claims	to	explore	it	from	the	inside,	reactualizing	it	by	following	its	various	logics	as	guiding	threads.	For	more	details	on	Serres’	critique	of	Foucault,	see	:	Hermès	I,	La	Communication,	pp.	167-191.	On	Foucault’s	conception	of	transdisciplinarity:	see	Etienne	Balibar’s	article	in	the	present	volume.		
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evolves	by	producing	 its	own	theory,	each	time	inventing,	by	transversal	generalisation,	a	new	 ‘globalising’	 language,	 which	 nevertheless	 remains	 intrinsic	 to	mathematics	 (Serres,	1968:	 78-112).	 For	 him,	 every	 science	 ‘speaks’;	 every	 science	 produces	 its	 own	 self-sufficient	 epistemology.	 By	 renaming	 epistemology	 a	 ‘language’,	 Serres	 highlights	 the	internal	 or	 endogenous	 character	 of	 his	 method 3 ,	 by	 opposition	 to	 an	 overbearing	conception	of	 theory.	He	considers	 that	 transdisciplinarity	or	 translation	best	approaches	the	movement	 of	 science	 itself:	 ‘The	new	 new	 [scientific]	 spirit	 is	 about	 thinking	without	reference;	transport	is	thought	itself.’	(Serres,	1972:	15-16)		First	 published	 in	Hermès	 III,	 La	 Traduction	 (1974),	 the	 following	 excerpt	 summarizes	 a	number	 of	 these	 developments	 in	 a	 highly	 condensed	way,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 it	marks	Serres’	 shift	 away	 from	structuralism.	 In	 this	passage,	Serres	draws	a	general	 typology	of	philosophy’s	 main	 ways	 of	 addressing,	 and	 situating	 itself	 towards,	 science.	 Whereas	philosophy’s	 relation	 to	 science	 remains	 generally	 caught	 up	 in	 a	 representational	paradigm,	or	perhaps	in	what	Althusser	called	the	 ‘philosophy	of	seeing’	(Althusser	&	alii,	1996:	35),	the	pre-disciplinary	philosophy	of	Leibniz	speaks	science	without	discrepancy;	in	it	 science	 is	not	an	object	of	knowledge,	but	a	medium.	 In	a	 surprising	move,	Serres	 thus	inverts	 the	history	of	philosophy:	Leibniz’s	pre-critical	 ‘naivety’	unmasks	 the	naivety	of	 a	critique	of	metaphysics	that	ends	up	restoring	a	new	kind	of	philosophy	in	its	place,	rather	than	 leaping	 into	 science.	 By	 ‘transdisciplinary	 exteriority’,	 Serres	means	 a	 language	 that	translates	the	knowledge	of	science	into	its	own	terms	and	truth	conditions,	a	standpoint	of	transversal	 generalisation	 or	 structure,	 in	 other	 words,	 a	 structuralism.	 Formerly	celebrated,	 this	 practice	 of	 relative	 exteriority,	 because	 it	 preserves	 an	 ineliminable	discrepancy	between	method	 and	 its	 object,	 structures	 and	 the	 real,	 is	 now	presented	 as	structuralism’s	essential	flaw.		
																																																								3	For	Serres,	«	method	»	needs	to	be	brought	back	to	one	of	its	etymological	image	:	-hodos	designating	a	way,	a	path,	a	means	of	access.		
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Transdisciplinarity	as	Relative	Exteriority	(1974)	
[On	Leibniz	and	the	Sciences]i		
Michel	Serres			Does	Leibniz	practice	the	philosophy	of	sciences?	How,	in	the	first	place,	to	define	it?	Where	is	it?	What	does	it	do?	It	is	apparently	any	kind	of	theory	of	science.	Yet	a	theory	is	primarily	a	 spectacle,	 and	 looking	 at	 a	 theatre	presupposes	 standing	 in	 a	 site	 exterior	 to	 the	 stage.	Leibniz	often	uses	the	word	theatre	(for	nature,	for	envelopments	and	developments	of	the	living…),	 but	 never	 for	 science.	 He	 is	 one	 of	 the	 heroes	 of	 an	 action	 that	 cannot	 become	representation	 without	 being	 altered,	 without	 losing	 its	 essence	 of	 direct	 action.	 He	provides	 the	only	discourse	 that	does	not	pretend,	 the	only	 judiciary	act	where	 the	 judge	must	be	party	in	order	to	give	his	sentence.	Indeed	Leibniz	speaks	from	within	science.	He	practices	it.		In	its	relation	to	scientific	knowledge,	philosophy	seeks	a	site	from	whence	to	speak	about	the	encyclopaedia.	But	the	latter,	well	constructed,	speaks	a	language	closed	upon	itself.	Yet	there	are	four	and	only	four	possible	sites	that	philosophers	have	discovered,	defined	and	practiced.	One	can	gaze	upon	something	from	above,	from	below,	from	the	front	or	from	the	
back.	Leibniz	never	adopted	any	of	these	points	of	view:	he	somewhat	[somehow?]	foresaw	that	all	four	were	conceivable;	he	envisioned	the	alteration	they	could	induce.	He	glimpsed	that	 the	 only	 discourse	 on	 science	 was	 the	 discourse	 of	 science	 itself,	 that	 its	 definition	could	 only	 be	 objectivised	 or	 thematised	 through	 its	 own	 course.	 These	 four	 sites	 define	four	types	or	modes	of	appropriation	of	science,	four	ingenious	ways	to	acquire	a	property	by	illicit	means	–	in	other	words,	to	gain	a	sovereign	science	without	going	through	science	as	such.		Briefly,	 the	 first	 of	 these	 points	 of	 view	 is	 the	 Greek	 site.	 Metaphysics	 is	 the	 queen	 of	sciences,	 in	 an	 overhanging,	 domineering	 position.	 Rigorous	 sciences	 are	 taken	 as	propaedeutic	 to	 the	 dialectic	 ascension,	 they	 are	 initiatory.	 Philosophy	 is	 a	 bird’s	 eye	thought,	 a	 collection	 of	 generative	 and	 constitutive	 ideas.	On	 the	 first	 steep	 slopes	 of	 the	mountain,	 dwell	 a	 few	 geometrician	 or	 arithmetician	 slaves,	 or	 the	 child	 that	 the	philosopher	once	was,	in	a	world	that	he	has	long	forgotten.	The	elevated	site	allows	him	to	judge	true	from	false,	relevancy	and	opinion.	Metaphysics	is	the	toponym	for	site.	There	is	a	queen;	she	is	normative.	It	is	said	[?]	science,	in	a	superlative	manner.		
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	The	second	point	of	view	is	the	Kantian	site.	Philosophy,	having	become	science,	extricates	the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 of	 the	 encyclopaedic	 exercise.	 It	 unfolds	 layers	 and	subterranean	 formations	 to	 be	 discovered	 in	 the	 act	 of	 the	 subject,	 or	 elsewhere.	 The	geological,	 paleontological,	 archaeological	 metaphors	 display	 an	 orientation	 towards	 the	grounding,	 the	 foundation,	 the	 origin.	 ‘What	 does	 science	 rest	 upon?’	 one	 asks.	 Such	chronology	 goes	 from	 Descartes	 to	 Kant,	 from	 Kant	 to	 Husserl	 and	 his	 epigones.	 The	transcendental	 (or	 the	historico-intentional)	 is	 the	 toponym	 for	 site.	There	 is	 a	 ground,	 a	constitutive	ground.	Philosophy	is	said	[to	be?]	science,	fundamentally.			The	 third	 point	 of	 view	 is	 the	 site	 of	 the	 Enlightenment.	 Philosophy	 projects	 in	 front	 of	itself,	 in	 a	 dynamic	 of	 progress,	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 true.	 The	 horizon	 –	 where	 fields	 of	attraction	permanently	polarize	the	history	of	science	–	constantly	recedes.	There	is	a	speed	vector	and	an	acceleration	vector,	both	oriented	 in	 the	direction	of	history.	 It	 is	a	 filter	of	true,	 of	 false,	 of	 the	 accident,	 of	 the	 essence,	 of	 the	 crisis,	 of	 accomplishment.	 ‘What	 is	science	 heading	 towards?’	 one	 asks.	 This	 chronology	 goes	 from	 the	Aufklärung	 to	 Hegel.	Teleology	 is	 the	 toponym	 for	 site.	 There	 is	 a	 telos,	 it	 is	 attracting	 [?].	 Philosophy	 is	 the	science	of	points	of	no	return.			The	fourth	point	of	view	is	the	site	of	modernity.	The	philosopher	is	a	distrustful	and	lucid	consciousness	 that	 cannot	 be	 easily	 fooled.	 He	 seeks	 out	 the	 almighty	 demon	 behind	science.	Behind	the	mask	of	knowledge	and	the	expert	language,	the	detective	epistemology	lays	 bare	 the	 class	 representation,	 the	 ideology	 in	 power,	 the	 hic	 fecit	 cui	 prodest,	 the	unknown	 or	 unthought,	 impulsive	 or	 dominant.	 From	 Marx,	 Nietzsche,	 Freud	 to	 the	contemporary,	 the	 reading	 techniques	 aim	 at	 a	 palimpsest:	 active	 writing	 stands	 behind	activated	writing.	One	asks:	 ‘What	 is	hiding	behind	 this	science,	which	performs	scenes	 it	doesn’t	 exactly	 own?	Who	 is	 the	 hidden	 engineer?	Who	 or	what	 is	 pulling	 the	 strings	 of	these	abused	puppets,	which	in	turn	abuse	us?’	The	approach	is	retroactive:	to	slip	behind	all	 effective	knowledge,	behind	each	and	every	 thing,	 to	 constitute,	 in	 the	 tradition	of	 the	impregnable	 discourse	 of	 philosophy,	 a	 discourse	 behind	 which	 no	 discourse	 can	 slide.	There	was	no	higher,	deeper	or	more	prophetic	discourse;	there	is	now	no	more	anterior,	more	archaic	discourse.	The	philosopher	sees	the	backs	but	he	has	no	back.	The	retroactive	is	the	toponym	for	site.	There	are	a	tergo	forces;	they	are	disruptive.			This	 law	 of	 the	 four	 cardinal	 sites	 brings	 us	 to	 the	 end	 of	 an	 adventure:	 that	 of	 the	impregnable	 texts	 kept	 external	 to	 knowledge:	 the	 four	 pathways	 of	 domination.	 From	
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these	 privileged	 locations,	 the	 philosopher	 invariably	 remains	 one	 who	 can	 neither	 be	mistaken	nor	mistake	us.	This	 could	be	a	definition	of	God:	 the	philosopher	 is	 the	heir	of	priests.	 The	 scientist	 takes	 risks	 and	 confronts	 the	 dangers	 of	 non-knowledge.	 His	endeavour	 is	 fallible;	 his	 discourse	 never	 goes	 beyond	 its	 self-imposed	 norms.	 Science	 is	bound	by	its	own	law,	it	is	a	game	bowed	in	front	of	the	rules.	Outside	the	field,	outside	the	limits,	 the	 theoretician-spectator	 can	 always	 try	 to	 escape	 the	 rules,	 what	 he	 calls	overtaking,	 his	 discourse	 unfailingly	 exceeds	 the	 norms	 he	 exposes.	 The	 philosopher	 is	 a	subtle	God,	that	no	one	can	catch	swindling.	He	plays	offside.	In	the	name	of	his	privilege,	he	gives	 himself	 the	 right	 to	 speak	 the	 very	 contrary	 of	 science:	 recuse	 [challenge?]	mathematics,	 immobilise	the	Earth,	negate	the	thermodynamic	principles,	etc.	Speaking	of	science,	he	does	not	speak	science.			This	can	be	refined.	Each	and	every	discipline	of	the	encyclopaedic	movement	has	served	as	a	suppletive	site,	from	which	to	speak	of	all	the	others.	Just	as	God	is	at	once	transcendent	and	immanent,	the	philosopher	is	simultaneously	outside	and	within.	In	other	words,	each	of	 the	 sites	 mentioned	 is	 endowed	 with	 an	 alibi.	 The	 Trojan	 horse.	 Situated	 above,	 but	leaning	on	mathematics;	 situated	below,	 yet	modelling	 itself	 on	mechanics,	 astronomy	or	logics;	 situated	 ahead,	 but	 taking	 his	 values	 from	biology	 or	 history;	 situated	 behind,	 yet	referring	 himself	 to	 the	 humanities.	 The	 global	 discrepancy	 (décalage),	 generative	 of	philosophical	discourse,	is	accompanied	by	a	local	centring	within	the	knowledge	cycle.	The	dominant	 discipline	 is	 the	 courthouse	 or	 the	 courthouse’s	 alibi.	 Philosophy	 remains	 the	science	of	sciences,	but	might	protect	itself	by	means	of	a	substitute:	the	region	elected	as	the	support	for	judgement	and	analysis.	It	is	a	small-scale	science	of	sciences.	Its	selection	in	the	encyclopaedia,	its	partition,	are	thus	to	be	justified.	They	are,	in	general,	induced	by	a	history.	How,	may	I	ask,	are	we	to	grab	by	the	tail	what	calls	 itself	a	mouse,	but	a	bird	an	instant	later?			In	any	case,	the	discrepancy	is	visible.	The	aim	is	to	take	distance	from	a	knowledge	that	is	thereby	objectivised,	to	see	it	from	outside,	in	order	to	stage	it	in	a	sovereign	and	untrapped	theory.	 Possessing	 the	 knowledge	 without	 having	 its	 knowledge.	 Three	 types	 of	discrepancy:	absolute	exteriority,	outside	of	the	encyclopaedia;	relative	or	transdisciplinary	exteriority;	and	finally,	total	substitution,	where	the	philosopher	starts	to	speak	directly	of	the	 object,	 bracketing	 science.	 Ultimately,	 we	 are	 either	 dealing	 with	 metaphysics	 (the	prefix	is	thus	clearly	defined),	interpretation	by	means	of	a	code	or	a	superimposed	filter,	or	a	dream,	 in	 the	manner	described	by	Diderot.	This	 is	not	a	condemnation;	dreams	can	be	fecund	or	premonitory.		
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	Let	 us	 eliminate	 distance,	 enter	 into	 the	 effective	 workings	 of	 science.	 Let	 its	 discourse	speak.	An	attentive	listener	will	easily	hear	its	implicit	philosophy.	Is	this	really	a	method?	Yes.	A	method	 is	 acceptable,	 not	 only	when	 the	organon	which	promotes	or	 justifies	 it	 is	rigorous,	or	when	it	stands	on	its	own	as	a	systematic	or	normative	monument	–	hence	the	derisory	efficiency	of	most	traditionally	taught	“methods”	(by	efficiency	we	mean	the	ratio	between	results	and	the	power	of	the	constructed	device)	–	but	when	it	is	fecund,	here	and	now.	A	method	is	preferable	by	virtue	of	what	it	does,	not	by	what	it	thinks.	At	stake	here	is	not	 to	speak	of,	around,	about,	on	(meaning	 ‘above’)	science,	but	simply	 to	speak	science,	one	science,	this	part,	that	theorem.		
Translated	by	Lucie	Mercier																																																										i	This text originally appeared under the heading ‘Philosophy of Science’ as the final part of the essay 
‘Leibniz Retranslated into Mathematical Language’, in Michel Serres, La Traduction: Hermès III (Paris: 
Minuit, 1974), pp. 152–7. The essay summarises Michel Serres’ 1968 doctoral dissertation on Leibniz, 
accounting for the relationship between Leibniz’s mathematical thought and his philosophy as one of 
translation.  
